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Voluntary Cleanups and Redevelopment Potential: Lessons from
Baltimore, Maryland
Summary
Policy has increasingly shifted towards economic incentives and liability attenuation for
promoting cleanup and redevelopment of contaminated sites, but little is known about
the effectiveness of such policies. An example of such legislation is State Voluntary
Cleanup Programs (VCPs), which were established in the US in the 1990s and to date
have been implemented in almost every state. We examine Baltimore properties that
participated in the Maryland VCP from its inception in 1997 to the end of 2006.
Specifically, we examine what type of properties tend to participate in these programs,
how these properties compare to other eligible but non-participating sites, and what is
the redevelopment potential of VCP properties and implications towards open space
conversion. We find that most applicants (66%) actually requested a “No Further Action
Determination” directly, rather than proposing cleanup. VCP properties tend to be
industrial, located in industrial areas, and away from residential neighborhoods. In more
recent years larger industrial properties have increasingly enrolled in the program. The
majority of sites are reused as industrial or commercial. In contrast to Alberini (2007),
this suggests that pressure for residential development does not drive VCP participation.
Based on differences in zoning requirements, the VCP may reduce demand for
potentially contaminating activities on pristine land by as much as 1,238 to 6,444 acres,
in Baltimore alone.
Keywords: Brownfields, Contaminated Sites, Voluntary Cleanup Programs, Incentives
JEL Classification: R14, Q58, K32
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VOLUNTARY CLEANUPS AND REDEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL:
LESSONS FROM BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

By Dennis Guignet and Anna Alberini
1. Introduction and Motivation
Many observers believe that the liability regime imposed by federal and state
hazardous waste programs in the US is at least partially responsible for discouraging the
purchase and reuse of contaminated or potentially contaminated sites, which have remained
idle or underutilized. 1 The resulting “brownfields”—industrial sites whose expansion,
redevelopment, or reuse “may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant” (US EPA, 2007), to the point that public
intervention may be needed (Alker et al., 2000)—cover thousands of acres in many urban and
rural areas of the country (US General Accounting Office, 1995).
A number of state programs and federal legislation have recently been established in
an attempt to reverse these disincentives and stimulate cleanup and productive reuse of
brownfields. For example, in the 1990s, several States established Voluntary Cleanup
Programs (VCPs) offering liability relief, other economic inducements such as tax credits or
low-cost loans, oversight and expedited approval of cleanup plans, and simplified cleanup
standards in exchange for site remediation (Bartsch and Dorfman, 2000; Meyer and
VanLandingham, 2000).
1

The Superfund program was established by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA), passed in 1980 and amended and re-authorized in 1986. It is probably the best known
among the public programs addressing hazardous waste sites in the US. Under the Superfund program the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to identify contaminated sites needing remediation,
track down the responsible parties and force them to pay for cleanup (or reimburse the Agency for the cleanups it
initiated). Liability for the cost of cleanup is retroactive, strict, and joint-and-several, with potentially responsible
parties to be sought among the owners and operators of the site, and transporters of the wastes. Liability has in
some cases been construed to apply to property owners and lenders that foreclose on contaminated properties
(Fogleman, 1992).
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Under the Federal Brownfield Tax Incentive, since 1997 environmental cleanup costs
for properties that meet specified requirements have been fully deductible in the year in which
they are incurred, as long as the property is for use in a trade or business or for the production
of income. Likewise, state brownfields programs grant tax credits or other benefits for
cleanup and investment at potentially contaminated properties in blighted areas.
Finally, the federal Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfield Revitalization Act
of 2002 provides conditional relief from environmental liability for property owners and
purchasers of land. This law also establishes the EPA Brownfield Program, which provides
assessment and cleanup grants to state and local governments and communities, as well as
grants which states can use to establish revolving loan funds.
Little is known about the effectiveness of these economic incentives and liability
attenuation policies in promoting cleanup and redevelopment. Questions have been raised
about whether these programs effectively provide public funding to redevelopment projects
that would have occurred anyway (Alberini, 2007), and concerns exist about dedicated public
funding that is left unspent (Schoenbaum, 2002). Common assertions that the majority of
brownfield properties are former industrial lands, that they are usually found in central cities,
and that their redevelopment is riskier and less profitable than equivalent projects on pristine
lands and suburban areas have been recently challenged (Page and Berger, 2006; DeSousa,
2000). Deason et al. (2001) analyze urban redevelopment projects and compute the size of
equivalent projects in open and suburban areas, showing that the latter often take up
considerable more land than infill redevelopment, thus contributing to sprawl and erosion of
open space.
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For these reasons, it is important to understand what types of properties tend to
participate in programs that offer incentives and assistance for brownfield cleanup and
redevelopment. In this paper, we examine the Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCP) of the state
of Maryland. We ask three related questions: First, what types of properties tend to participate
in the Maryland VCP? Second, how do these properties compare with other eligible but
nonparticipating industrial and commercial properties? Third, what is the redevelopment
potential of VCP parcels, and can redevelopment of VCP sites help prevent conversion of
agricultural land and open space in suburban and rural areas of the State?
To answer these questions, we examine the parcels enrolled in the VCP from its onset
(in 1997) to late December 2006. To ensure a relatively homogeneous (legal and tax)
environment, attention is restricted to participating properties in Baltimore City. 2 We
supplement this set of parcels with a sample of comparable size drawn at random from the
universe of industrial and commercial properties in Baltimore City, which we use as a
“control” group. The newly formed sample—enlisted properties plus “controls”—allows us to
establish whether the VCP tends to attract parcels that are systematically different from the
rest of the supply of industrial and commercial properties in Baltimore.
Simple univariate analyses suggest that VCP enlistees are generally larger and less
capital intensive than the bulk of industrial and commercial properties in Baltimore, and have
a higher prior probability of contamination than non-participating parcels. Probit regressions
confirm that participation is more likely among industrial sites located in industrial areas, and
less likely where buildings are present and close to residential areas.
Even more important, the probit regressions point to the changing nature of the
program—or of the sites that tend to be attracted to the program. In the first few years, smaller
2

By “Baltimore City” we mean Baltimore City County, i.e., the independent-city county with FIPS code 24510.
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properties tended to be attracted into the program. Most recently, however, participation has
been more likely among larger properties, and the prevalence of industrial sites among the
participants has become even stronger.
To answer the third question, we examine the restrictions imposed on the property
when the State agency granted “No further action” status or issued a certificate of cleanup
completion. In most cases, residential uses are not allowed, some physical maintenance is
required to avoid exposure to contaminants, and use of groundwater on the premises for
drinking purposes is prohibited. There is very little evidence of changes in the land use at
participating sites, and at any rate participating properties tend to be located primarily away
from residential areas. Taken together, these facts suggest that VCP sites will likely remain in
some type of industrial or commercial use. These conclusions are in sharp contrast with
Alberini (2007), who finds that the Colorado VCP tends to attract sites under residential
development pressure.
Finally, we use the figures presented in Deason et al. (2001) to compute the area that
would be reasonably required if instead of redeveloping the Baltimore VCP properties,
equivalent projects were undertaken in more rural/suburban areas of the State. Under alternate
assumptions, we estimate this total area to be between 1,238 and 6,444 acres. We conclude
that the VCP holds good promise as a tool for reducing pressure on the conversion of open
space and agricultural land. This finding should be interpreted with caution. Comparison of
the findings of this paper with previous research (Alberini, 2007) suggests that until further
research is done on this topic it will be difficult to extrapolate from one specific program and
its achievements to another.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background
information and describes the Maryland VCP. Section 3 reviews the literature. Section 4
presents our econometric model of participation in a VCP and data sources. Section 5
describes the data and section 6 the estimation results. Section 7 discusses the implications of
our findings, and Section 8 concludes.

2. Background
A. Brownfields and Brownfields Programs
In the United States, there is a large supply of properties where prior industrial uses
have resulted in contamination of soil, surface water and/or groundwater with pollutants that
are noxious to human health and ecological systems. The US GAO (1995) estimates a
nationwide total of 130,000 to 450,000 contaminated commercial and industrial sites.
It is widely felt that site contamination, or even suspicion of contamination, seriously
hampers reuse. Many observers argue that the mere placement of a property on federal or
state registries of sites needing investigation about possible contamination turns them into
brownfields. Removal from such registries (the so-called “de-listing”) would automatically
remove any contamination “stigma” (Bartsch et al., 1996).
Starting in the 1990s, the States, realizing that their enforcement-based programs did
not have sufficient funding to address the large number of contaminated sites needing
attention, began developing an alternative approach based on voluntary cleanup programs (US
GAO, 1997). It has recently been suggested that less financial support from the EPA and slow
progression at Superfund sites, among other factors, increase the likelihood of state adoption
of a VCP (Daley, 2007). By 2000, over 90% of the states had a VCP in place (Meyer, 2000).
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Program offerings and requirements vary widely across states (Meyer, 2000; US EPA,
2005). Many state-level voluntary cleanup programs grant liability relief in exchange for
voluntary cleanup, provided that the latter is approved by the state agency, in the form of a
letter of no further action, a certificate of completion, or a covenant not to sue. 3
Voluntary cleanup programs often spell out simplified or variable cleanup standards
linked to land use, and hence to residents and workers’ likely exposure to contaminants. Some
states allow for engineering controls, such as caps, fences, or other physical means of
preventing contact with pollution, and/or offer institutional controls, such as permanent land
use restrictions or monitoring of the contamination plume, in lieu of a more permanent
cleanup. The US GAO (1997) surveyed 17 states with VCPs and found that in many of them
over 50% of the cleanups entailed non-permanent remedies and/or selected industrial land use
standards.
In addition, the State frequently offers fast-track oversight of cleanup plans. This helps
reduce the time it takes before remediation is undertaken, as well as the uncertainty associated
with stringency of cleanup standards (Meyer, 2000). At many locales, completion of
voluntary cleanups at eligible sites can be combined with local, state, and federal
“brownfields” programs that offer subsidies in the form of tax credits or low-cost loans. State
VCP managers believe that the programs have resulted in the reporting of contaminated sites
that were previously unknown to the state agency, and have truly encouraged cleanups, as
long as the program requirements are not too burdensome to the applicants. 4

3

A covenant not to sue is generally regarded as the strongest form of assurance, since for all practical purposes it
is a contract by which the State commits not to sue over contamination at the site, as long as certain conditions
are met.
4
For example, the 1997 US GAO study notes that public involvement requirements are generally judged
inappropriate, and hence a hurdle to remediation, for the type of sites usually targeted by VCPs—industrial sites
with light contamination.
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B. The Maryland VCP
The Maryland VCP was established in 1997. Any property that is or perceived to be
contaminated by controlled hazardous substances or oil (since October 2004) is eligible for
participation, including sites on federal or state registries. Sites on the National Priorities List,
sites under active enforcement by the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE),
currently operating RCRA sites, and sites contaminated after October 1, 1997 (if the applicant
is a responsible party) are not eligible. Certain exceptions may apply to sites under MDE
enforcement.
Eligible applicants include property owners, commercial lenders, developers,
prospective purchasers, lessees, innocent purchasers and operators. The application must
contain a Phase I and Phase II environmental site assessment, a $6,000 application fee and
any other information about the property required by the agency. The applicant may request a
“No Further Requirements Determination,” which, if granted, implies no need to perform
remedial work, or, upon approval of the response plan and of remediation, a “Certification of
Completion.” Both include certain liability assurances and are recorded in the Land Records.
The liability relief offered is not absolute: so-called reopeners are possible if new
contamination occurs at the property, if cleanup exacerbates—rather than ameliorates—the
existing contamination, if undiscovered contamination is found, or if there is an imminent and
substantial threat to human health. However, at the time of this writing, MDE notes that only
two reopeners have been issued since the inception of the program. 5 A Certificate of

5

http://www.mde.state.md.us/Programs/LandPrograms/ERRP_Brownfields/vcp_info/vcp_eligibility.asp,
accessed 8 May 2008.
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Completion (CoC) does not provide protection against third party suits, but does provide
contribution protection against a third party suit.6

3. Previous Literature
We are aware of only a handful of previous studies that have examined the economic
incentives at play in VCPs. Alberini (2007) focuses on the Colorado VCP, and concludes that
this program has not addressed sites on federal registries, has implied actual cleanups at only
one-third of the participating sites, and seems to attract properties that are very likely to be
redeveloped soon. She also finds that property values tend to be lower in truly contaminated
properties, but rebound almost completely after participation. Using data from the State of
Ohio for 1989-1992, Sementelli and Simons (1997) find that receiving a letter of “no further
action” from the State does not improve transaction rates for sites with leaking underground
storage tanks, which continue to be bought and sold much less frequently than non-tank
commercial properties.
Page and Berger (2006) examine properties that entered into the VCPs of Texas and
New York, emphasizing that these are only a subset of the entire universe of brownfields in
those states. They wish to empirically test four common beliefs about brownfields, namely
that they are (i) the results of past industrial land use, (ii) in abundant supply in older
industrial regions, (iii) primarily an urban problem, and (iv) created by pollution events that
took place before the Superfund statute (or similar state legislation). Texas and New York
lend themselves to these research questions because of their different histories in terms of
industrial development and recent population and employment trends.

6

In other words, another responsible party who has been sued by parties other than the State or Federal Agency
cannot demand reimbursement from the recipient of a Certificate of Completion.
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Page and Berger distinguish between previous industrial or commercial use, and use at
the time of entry into the program, finding that Texas actually has higher percentages of sites
with prior and current industrial uses than New York, and that a higher share of the New York
brownfields are abandoned at the time they entered the program (21% v. 8%, respectively).
The majority of the Texas sites are in urban areas and in central cities (87% and 64% of the
total, respectively, against 49% and 30% for New York). They conclude that industrial uses
do account for the majority—but not an overwhelming majority (53%)—of the properties
enrolled in the New York and Texas VCPs, and that suburban properties are surprisingly more
common in the New York program.
Page and Berger also raise the issue of distribution of size of brownfield properties.
They report that half of the properties enrolled in the New York VCP were one acre or less,
while over three-quarters of the properties in the Texas VCP were at least one acre or larger.
Since VCPs often have explicit land revitalization goals, our research is also related to
the literature that has examined developer interest in reusing brownfield properties. Statedpreference surveys in Europe (Alberini et al., 2005) and in the US (Wernstedt et al., 2006)
suggest that developers can be attracted to contaminated sites by offering them subsidies,
liability relief, and less stringent regulation. 7 The appeal of these incentives varies with the
developer’s prior experience with contaminated properties.

7

Economic inducements have been advocated as potentially effective for stimulating cleanup and redevelopment
of brownfields (Bartsch et al., 1996; DeSousa, 2004; Howland, 2000, 2004; Yount and Meyer, 1999). The
effectiveness of economic development incentives remains a controversial matter even with non-contaminated
properties. For example, recent studies suggest a statistically significant, positive relationship between tax
incentives and regional and local growth and property values (Bartik, 1991; Greenstone and Moretti, 2003;
Newman and Sullivan, 1988; Wasylenko, 1997), but researchers dispute the magnitude of the impacts of
incentives on overall economic gains in targeted areas (Fisher and Peters, 1998; Fox and Murray, 2004; Peters
and Fisher, 2002). Research in this area is afflicted by the problem that concurrent incentives make it very
difficult to disentangle the effects of each, a problem that can be remedied only by deploying very careful quasiexperimental approaches with control and treatment groups (Bartik, 2004; Greenstone and Moretti, 2003). It
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De Sousa (2000) interviews a small number (N=18) of developers, landowners, and
city officials, about their perceptions of redevelopment opportunities and economic incentives
for brownfields, finding that liability is judged the most important obstacle to brownfield
projects. Landowners and developers share similar views, especially on liability attenuation,
suggesting that VCPs that offer protection from liability are likely to attract primarily these
parties.
Meyer and Lyons (2000) suggest that low property prices have played a larger role
than subsidies in stimulating entrepreneurial redevelopment activity on contaminated sites,
and that obtaining subsidies may entail significant transaction costs that offset their value.
McGrath (2000) finds that contamination risk—i.e., the probability that a previously used site
is contaminated, based on the previous use—does affect urban industrial redevelopment in
Chicago both directly, and indirectly, via the differential in price before and after
redevelopment.
Deason et al. (2001), De Sousa (2000) and Sigman (2005) have studied the potential
for substitution between infill redevelopment and development of pristine or agricultural
lands—the so-called greenfields. Based on zoning and land use ordinances for several cities,
Deason et al. estimate that an industrial, commercial, and residential development project
requires an average of 6, over two, and over 5 times more land, respectively, in greenfield
areas than they do at urban brownfield properties. These differences are driven by local
requirements in terms of setbacks, height of buildings, parking facilities, and percentage of
the property that can be covered by buildings. De Sousa (2000) reports that, contrary to claims
sometimes made by developers, in downtown Toronto residential projects are actually more

remains difficult, however, to ascertain whether incentives were effective or business locations and/or area
redevelopment would have taken place even in their absence (Peters and Fisher, 2004).
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profitable at brownfields than in suburban areas (due to demand and prices of downtown
residential properties).
We conclude our literature review by noting that not everyone agrees that actual or
suspected contamination is a deterrent to redevelopment. Based on interviews with real estate
agents, Howland (2004) suggests that incompatible land uses, inadequate infrastructure and
obsolete buildings are more important barriers than contamination to the revitalization of
brownfields in Baltimore. Schoenbaum (2002) finds no significant difference in assessed land
values, vacancy rates, property turnover, and redevelopment rates across brownfield and nonbrownfield properties in an industrial area of Baltimore over 1963-1999.

4. Model, Sample and Data Sources
A. The Model.
Consider a set of “candidate” parcels. We assume that a parcel is enrolled in the VCP
if the net benefits of participation are positive, 8 and that these benefits depend on
characteristics of the property and surrounding neighborhood. Let VCP* denote the net
benefits of parcel i’s participation in the program in year t, and assume that:
(1)

VCPit* = x it β + η it ,

where x is a vector of parcel and neighborhood characteristics, β is a vector of unknown
coefficients, and η is an i.i.d. standard normal error term.

8

For an owner, the net benefits would be the appreciation in the value of the property, minus the cost of
remediation, the participation fee, and any other associated costs. For a developer, the net benefits are the profits
from the project, net of land acquisition costs, transformation costs, remediation costs, VCP fee, etc. The avoided
liability and litigation costs would presumably be captured into the appreciation and proceeds from the project,
respectively.

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

13

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 246 [2009]

13
We cannot observe the net benefits of participation, but because we assume that
properties are signed up (i.e., VCP=1) when the net benefits of participation are positive, we
obtain a probit equation:

E (VCPit = 1) = Pr(VCPit* ≥ 0) = Φ(x it β ) ,

(2)

where Φ(•) is the standard normal cdf. Because a site can only participate in the program
once, we specify the log likelihood function as:

log L =

(3)

2006

∑ ∑ [VCP

t =1997 i∈ℑt

it

⋅ log Φ(x it β ) + (1 − VCPit ) ⋅ log(1 − Φ(x it β ))] ,

where i denotes the site, t denotes the year of the program, and ℑt is the set “at risk” at time t
(i.e., the set of candidate sites that have not participated yet in year t). 9 Equation (3) is,
effectively, a discrete-time duration model, and can be easily amended to incorporate sitespecific random effects, which capture unobserved parcel characteristics that may influence
participation (see Greene, 2008, p. 796-806). 10

B. The Sample
Our goal is to estimate a probit equation that predicts the probability of participation in
the VCP as a function of site and neighborhood characteristics. Estimating this probit
equation requires a sample of both participating sites and eligible but non-participating sites.
We obtained data about the VCP applications and sites from the Maryland Department
of the Environment (MDE). As of December 20, 2006, more than 400 applications had been
submitted to the Maryland VCP.
9

For example, if a site participates in the program in 1999, it is dropped from the sample for all subsequent
years.
10
The random effects probit assumes that the unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the regressors x. It
is not possible to estimate a fixed effects model, because estimation would have to rely on parcels dropping in
and out of the participation status, a situation that is not possible here.
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In this paper, attention is restricted to VCP sites in Baltimore City since the onset of
the program up to 20 December 2006. By participation, we mean a direct application for
either a No Further Requirements Determination (NFRD) or an actual cleanup proposal, so
we lump together applications for a NFRD and a Certificate of Completion (CoC). In some
cases there are multiple applicants for the same site; in a few cases a single site is comprised
of multiple parcels. When multiple parties apply for the same property, we define
participation to occur at the time of the earliest submittal for that property.
Using these criteria, we obtain a total of 116 participating sites in Baltimore City as of
December 20, 2006. Of these 116 sites, 37 (32%) were signed up with the goal of obtaining a
CoC, which requires submitting and executing a remedial plan, 77 (66%) applied directly for
a NFRD, and no information is available for the two remaining sites.
We now have the full list of participating properties, but how exactly does one go
about defining the eligible but non-participating properties? Since “Any property
contaminated or perceived to be contaminated by controlled hazardous substances or oil is
eligible for participation,” and Noonan and Vidich (1992) show that properties used for most
industrial and commercial purposes have a moderate to high probability of contamination, it is
reasonable to assume that any parcel slated for industrial or commercial use in Baltimore is a
credible candidate for inclusion in the sample (see Sigman, 2005, and Page and Berger, 2006).
The first step in constructing our sample is thus to draw a random sample of N=131
industrial and commercial parcels out of the universe of all such sites in Baltimore. To make
these randomly selected parcels proper “controls” for the participating properties, we form
predictions for the likelihood of contamination (PROBCON) based on current land use at the
site and on the estimated probabilities reported by Noonan and Vidich (1992). This variable is
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included in our probit regressions, along with a companion missing-value dummy when the
records from the Maryland Department of Taxation do not contain specific land use
information.
In sum, by drawing a random sample of nonparticipating properties of roughly the
same size as that of the participating properties, and controlling for an obvious determinant of
their interest in the VCP, we are effectively constructing a “control” group (see Shadish, Cook
and Campbell, 2002) that can be compared with VCP participants.
For each of the 10 years of our study period (1997-2006), the sample we use for the
probit model is comprised of the participating parcels that have not signed up yet, plus all of
the 131 abovementioned non-participating sites. This results in a total of 247 properties and
2097 observations.

C. Other Independent Variables
We proxy the net profits of participation with parcel and neighborhood characteristics.
These include the size of the parcel (SIZE), a dummy for the presence of a building or
improvement (BUILDING), an interaction between the presence of a building and the year of
construction of the oldest building on the premises (BUILDINGYRBUILT), and the capital
intensity (CAPITAL) of the parcel, which we define as the total square footage of the building
divided by the area of the property.
These variables proxy for remediation and demolition costs. Heavily built sites may
differ from others in terms of demolition and cleanup costs because of toxic construction
materials (e.g., asbestos, heavy metals). To avoid losing observations to the analysis because
of missing values, we created companion dummy variables to denote missing values, recoded
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the original missing values to zero, and included both the regressors of interest and the
companion missing value dummies in the right-hand side of our probit regressions.
A parcel’s value should also be influenced by its distance to the central business
district (CBDDIST) and to major roads (MJRRDDIST), 11 whether it is for industrial use
(MINDUSTRIAL), surrounding land use, and distance to the nearest residential zone
(RESZNEDIST). We include the latter variable because Howland (2003, 2004) discusses how
potential buyers in Baltimore are reluctant to purchase industrial property near residential
areas because of incompatible activities and greater political barriers.

Regarding land use,

we use 1996 land use data from the Maryland Department of Planning to form 500- and 1500meter buffers around each property and compute the percentage of the area of the buffer in
various types of land use, such as low-, medium- and high-density residential, industrial, and
commercial.
A parcel’s eligibility for Enterprise Zone incentives (usually in the form of tax credits
if a business is established on the premises) and for federal Empowerment Zone incentives
(dummies ENTZNE and EMPZNE) may also influence its participation in the VCP. It should
be noted that these incentives are associated with setting up a business or offering employees
certain educational opportunities at specific locations, and are unrelated to contamination and
cleanup. They may, nevertheless, increase the attractiveness of a location to a developer and
to prospective buyers.
It is of interest to check whether VCP sites tend to be clustered, reflecting either some
effect on surrounding properties (i.e., participating sites induce further participation) or
simply the spatial concentration of the existing supply of contaminated sites. We control for
this tendency with the number of sites previously enrolled in the VCP within a 1500 meter
11

Data from the Maryland State Highway Administration.
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buffer of each property (LNEARVCPS). Our last set of independent variables is comprised of
median house values (MDVALHS) and socioeconomic characteristics of the residents in the
neighborhood measured at the 2000 Census tract level.

5. The Data
A. Description of Properties
For 92 of the 116 sites participating in the VCP, we were able to identify the
corresponding parcel(s) in the Maryland Department of Taxation database, and to append
information about the parcel, its exact location (latitude and longitude), structures, assessed
value, and recent sales (if any). The 116 participating sites are actually comprised of 172
properties, since in 21 cases one VCP application consists of multiple adjacent parcels. 12 The
same type of parcel information is also available for the 131 “control” properties.
Descriptive statistics of the sample are displayed in table 1. The average parcel in our
sample covers about 5 acres, and is located a little over 2 miles from the CBD. Almost all
parcels (79%) have a building or other improvement, which account on average for 77% of
the total property area (variable CAPITAL). Due to the criteria we used for constructing our
sample, industrial properties account for over 40% of all parcels.
Table 1 also shows that we were able to impute the prior probability of contamination
for 175 properties. Regarding additional neighborhood characteristics, half of the parcels in
our sample are located in a state Enterprise Zone and 23% are in a federal Empowerment
Zone. On average industrial uses account for about 25% of the 500-meter buffer and almost

12

Specifically, out of the 116 VCP sites, 95 consist of a single parcel, 12 of two parcels, 3 of three parcels, and 1
each of four, five, six, seven, eight and fourteen properties.
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20% of the 1500-meter buffer around the properties. The median housing value in the
surrounding census tract is on average about $73,000.

B. Comparison across VCP and Non-participating Sites
Maps of the VCP sites suggest that participating properties are more likely to be in
areas where economic inducements, such as those associated with Enterprise Zones and
federal Empowerment Zones, are offered to firms (see map A.1 in Appendix A). Although
they tend to be roughly at the same distance from the city center, participating sites tend to be
farther from major roads than non-participating eligible properties (see map A.2 in Appendix
A). Participating sites are more likely to be surrounded by industrial properties, and tend to be
located farther away from residential zones (see map A.3 in Appendix A). This confirms that
our probit model should control for the industrial v. another use of the parcel, for the
prevalent uses in the neighborhood, and for distance to the nearest residential area, as
mentioned in section 4.
We compare the means of all variables across participating and non-participating sites
in our sample in table 2. This table shows that participating properties tend to be considerably
larger than non-participating eligible properties, and somewhat less likely to contain buildings
or other improvements. 13
Participating properties tend to be less capital-intensive. Buildings at participating
sites are likely slated for demolition during redevelopment, thus a less capital intensive site
13

We note that sometimes multiple parcels were combined into the same application to the VCP (and into the
same redevelopment project). The average size of a VCP site is 9.82 acres for the sites consisting of one parcel,
13.52 for the sites comprised of two parcels, 4.49 for the sites comprised of 3 parcels, 1.5 for one site comprised
of 4 parcels, 1.21 for the one site comprised of 5 parcels, 54.34 for the one site with 6 parcels, 1.98 for the one
site with 7 parcels, 6 acres for the one site with 8 parcels, and finally 1.44 for the one site with 14 parcels. This
suggests that in some cases it was necessary for developers to combine several very small parcels together to get
a site of acceptable size for redevelopment.
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may be more attractive due to lower demolition costs.

Howland (2004) interviewed

Baltimore real estate agents and industrial property owners and found that the expense of
removing obsolete structures is one barrier to redevelopment.
There are no systematic differences across the two groups of properties in terms of
housing values and share of residents with a college degree. The proportion of residents who
own their homes—as opposed to renting them—is higher in the vicinity of participating
properties than near non-participating properties. The proportion of residents living in poverty
tends to be lower surrounding participating properties. In terms of race and ethnicity of the
neighborhood, participating properties tend to be located in neighborhoods with less AfricanAmericans, but there is no systematic difference regarding the proportion of persons of
Hispanic heritage.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. Full sample (N=247).
N valid
obs

Description

SIZE

area of parcel in acres

247

5.390

12.020

CBDDIST

distance to CBD (Inner Harbor) in meters

246

3764.99

2321.17

BUILDING

building or other improvement present (dummy)

247

0.794

0.406

YRBUILT

year the oldest building was built

52

1943.31

30.944

CAPITAL

capital intensity

247

0.768

1.228

MJRDDIST

distance to nearest major road in meters

246

466.375

481.852

PROBCON

a priori probability of contamination

175

0.475

0.304

PROBCONMISSING

probability of contamination undefined (dummy)

247

0.291

0.455

ENTZNE

located in enterprise zone (dummy)

246

0.516

0.501

EMPZNE

located in empowerment zone (dummy)
number of properties previously enrolled in VCP
within 1500m buffer (all years)

246

0.236

0.425

247

2.530

4.413

zoned industrial (dummy)
percent of land slated for industrial within 1500m
buffer
percent of land slated for industrial within 500m
buffer

247

0.417

0.494

246

0.196

0.212

246

0.257

0.310

246

155.439

202.877

245

73267

36745

PCTPOVERTY

distance to nearest residential zone in meters
median housing value in census tract (2000
dollars)
percent of census tract population living below
poverty line

246

0.237

0.125

PCTOWNERS

percent residents in census tract who own home

246

0.481

0.228

PCTBLACKS

percent blacks in census tract

246

0.364

0.335

PCTHISPANICS

percent Hispanics in census tract
percent persons with college degree in census
tract

246

0.024

0.027

246

0.175

0.150

LNEARVCPS
MINDUSTRIAL
PCTIND
PCTIND500M
RESZNEDIST
MDVALHS

PCTCOLLEGE

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

Mean

Std
deviation

Variable

21

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 246 [2009]

21
Table 2. Comparison of means of variables for participating (VCP=1) and nonparticipating (VCP=0) parcels. T test of the null hypothesis that the difference in the
means is zero.
VCP=0
Variable

N valid
obs

Mean

VCP=1
Std
deviation

N valid
obs

Mean

Std
deviation

t statistic

SIZE

131

1.188

5.940

116

10.134

15.046

-6.003**

CBDDIST

131

3834.800

2579.010

115

3685.470

1995.580

0.511

BUILDING

131

0.901

0.300

116

0.672

0.471

4.476**

YRBUILT

5

1917.000

26.833

47

1946.110

30.261

-2.277**

CAPITAL

131

1.141

1.305

116

0.347

0.982

5.435**

MJRDDIST

131

322.770

421.112

115

629.959

496.055

-5.197**

PROBCON

100

0.278

0.183

75

0.736

0.225

-14.419**

PROBCONMISSING

131

0.237

0.427

116

0.353

0.480

-2.010*

ENTZNE

131

0.427

0.497

115

0.617

0.488

-3.020**

EMPZNE

131

0.168

0.375

115

0.313

0.466

-2.667**

LNEARVCPS

131

2.416

4.569

116

2.722

4.132

-0.553

MINDUSTRIAL

131

0.145

0.353

116

0.724

0.449

-11.164**

PCTIND

131

0.080

0.130

115

0.327

0.211

-10.864**

PCTIND500M

131

0.084

0.187

115

0.454

0.305

-11.277**

RESZNEDIST

131

103.986

164.188

115

214.051

226.290

-4.314**

MDVALHS

130

75297.690

45078.930

115

70972.170

24094.090

0.951

PCTPOVERTY

131

0.260

0.137

115

0.211

0.104

3.183**

PCTOWNERS

131

0.409

0.235

115

0.563

0.190

-5.648**

PCTBLACKS

131

0.474

0.339

115

0.239

0.285

5.903**

PCTHISPANICS

131

0.023

0.028

115

0.025

0.027

-0.635

PCTCOLLEGE
131
0.177
0.144
115
0.172
0.158
^ = significant at the 10% level; * = significant at the 5% level; ** = significant at the 1% level.

0.250
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C. Features of Participating Sites
Among the VCP properties, we found no obvious differences between those that
applied for a NFRD and those for which a cleanup plan was submitted, other than in the
prior probability of contamination, which is larger for the latter group. Among
participating properties, those slated for industrial use tend to be larger than commercial
properties.
Figure 1 displays the distribution of land use at Baltimore City participating sites
by the year of enrollment, showing that (i) participation has picked up steam since the
inception of the program, with the largest enrollment (22) in 2006, and (ii) industrial
properties make up the majority of the enlisted sites. Commercial properties started being
signed up for the program starting in 2000, but still account for a small fraction of all
sites. Residential properties are even less common.

Figure 1.
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Perusal of figure 1 suggests that, all else the same, participation rates and hence
the likelihood of participation have changed over time. This may have occurred because
of changes in the eligibility criteria, changes in the economic climate of the city, and
changes in the real estate market. For this reason, we group the ten years from the
inception of the program to 2006 into three discrete periods (1997-1999, 2000-2003, and
2004-2006), and interact key regressors with dummies for these periods.
The late 1990s period captures the early years of the program. In 1999 there was a
change in Baltimore City’s government when Mayor Martin O’Malley took over for Kurt
Schmoke, who had been mayor since 1987. This change in City Government may have
resulted in changes of several aspects of City law, taxation, redevelopment efforts, etc. In
2004, the VCP program was changed, in that it began to admit oil pollution sites. These
are likely to differ in size and/or use relative to sites contaminated by other hazardous
wastes.

For example, gas stations are comparatively small and are considered a

commercial use. A change in political climate also occurred after 2003, when Robert
Ehrlich, a Republican, took over as Governor of Maryland for Democrat Parris
Glendening.

It is possible that this shift in State Government may have changed

priorities for state agencies.
Based on these considerations, we enter in the model the variable SIZE—a likely
determinant of participation—plus SIZE2, the interaction term between SIZE and the
dummy denoting the second period of the study (2000-2003), and SIZE3, the interaction
term between SIZE and the third period of the study (2004-2006). This inclusion allows
for the effect of property size on the probability of participation to vary over time.
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6. Estimation Results
Table 3 reports the results for the random effects probit model of participation. 14
We present four specifications. Specification (A) is our base specification, which
includes size of the property and interactions between size and time period, in addition to
the regressors listed in Section 4.C. Specification (B) adds an interaction between the
industrial-use dummy and the last time period of the study (MINDUSTRIAL3).
Specifications (C) and (D) include census tract characteristics (as of 2000) to capture
socioeconomic differences in neighborhood character.
Table 2 had suggested that the VCP tends to attract larger sites. This would
appear to be a recent phenomenon because the results of all the probit specifications in
table 3 suggest that in the early years the program actually attracted smaller properties,
but that trend was subsequently reversed. These are the implications of the signs and
significance levels of the coefficient on SIZE, SIZE2, and SIZE3. It is possible that in the
later years developers became familiar with the workings of the program and saw
opportunities for economies of scale in assessment, development, and cleanup; moreover,
larger sites cater to large projects and can be subdivided.

14

The correlation between any two error terms within the same site is generally small (about 0.03) and
significant only at the 10% level. Nevertheless, random effects were incorporated to obtain the correct
standard errors.
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Table 3. Random Effects probit regression results. Dependent variable:
participation in year t of the program.
(A)
Variable

coefficient

(B)
tstat

coefficient

(C)
tstat

coefficient

(D)
tstat

coefficient

tstat

INTERCEPT

‐1.678010

‐4.94**

‐1.449801

‐4.21**

‐1.164552

‐2.53*

‐1.667947

‐3.85**

SIZE
SIZE2 = size*(2000‐
03 dummy)
SIZE3 = size*(2004‐
06 dummy)

‐0.018765

‐2.01*

‐0.013602

‐1.54

‐0.013987

‐1.58

‐0.013935

‐1.57

0.013557

1.40

0.013386

1.46

0.013249

1.44

0.013344

1.44

0.036325

3.62**

0.021049

2.02*

0.021564

2.06*

0.022257

2.11*

CBDDIST

0.000001

0.03

‐0.000024

‐0.65

‐0.000035

‐0.89

‐0.000026

‐0.63

BUILDING

‐0.226463

‐1.37

‐0.260919

‐1.57

‐0.258604

‐1.54

‐0.268075

‐1.60

BUILDINGYRBUILT

‐0.000078

‐0.68

‐0.000092

‐0.79

‐0.000106

‐0.91

‐0.000103

‐0.88

YRBUILTMISSING

‐0.640592

‐3.21**

‐0.719794

‐3.58**

‐0.757513

‐3.66**

‐0.760784

‐3.65**

CAPITAL

‐0.187718

‐2.66**

‐0.196322

‐2.73**

‐0.201543

‐2.77**

‐0.197466

‐2.72**

MJRDDIST

‐0.000180

‐1.41

‐0.000183

‐1.42

‐0.000143

‐1.05

‐0.000151

‐1.08

PROBCON

0.475813

1.79^

0.475370

1.77^

0.464092

1.72^

0.445313

1.64

PROBCONMISSING

0.137286

0.70

0.119255

0.61

0.125401

0.64

0.111832

0.57

ENTZNE

‐0.014003

‐0.08

‐0.017537

‐0.11

‐0.064305

‐0.36

‐0.012449

‐0.07

EMPZNE

0.068361

0.42

0.142767

0.88

0.113200

0.64

0.135206

0.82

LNEARVCPS

0.058682

5.08**

0.042576

3.42**

0.044719

3.49**

0.043546

3.42**

MINDUSTRIAL

0.454171

3.27**

0.238738

1.58

0.220864

1.44

0.231807

1.52

PCTIND

0.557989

1.41

0.589488

1.47

0.588896

1.46

0.332140

0.66

RESZNEDIST

0.000684

2.41*

0.000688

2.41*

0.000682

2.41*

0.000730

2.37*

0.734217

3.79**

0.716439

3.67**

0.711673

3.65**

‐0.000003

‐0.82

0.104482

0.16

PCTPOVERTY

0.976555

1.08

PCTOWNERS

0.331421

0.62

‐0.241601

‐0.75

MINDUSTRIAL3
MDVALHS
PCTCOLLEGE

PCTBLACKS
Log Likelihood

‐351.31053

‐344.22415

‐343.50624

‐343.62496

^ = significant at the 10% level; * = significant at the 5% level; ** = significant at the 1% level.

The probit model confirms that participation is also more likely to occur among
sites without buildings (an effect that is not significant at the conventional levels,
however) and among properties with lower capital intensity, suggesting a preference for
sites with lower demolition and remediation costs. Distance to the city center or to major
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roads does not seem to be an important driver of participation. This finding should be
interpreted with caution, because it may be due to collinearity and to the use of imperfect
proxies for site access. Distance to the city center is correlated with several other spatial
characteristics, and distance to major roads may not fully capture how easy or difficult it
is to access a particular property in an urban setting.
As expected, participation is positively and significantly associated with the prior
probability of contamination—in other words, the program is attracting sites that one
would truly expect to be contaminated. That does not mean, of course, that the property
must necessarily be cleaned up, and indeed about two-thirds of the VCP applications, as
discussed in section 4.C, request a NFRD.
There is no evidence of an independent effect of Enterprise and Empowerment
Zone designations. However, these designations are correlated with land use, location,
and size of the site. Once again, it is thus difficult to say whether this result is genuine or
an artifact of collinearity. Most likely VCP properties—brownfields, for all practical
purposes—are typically in abundant supply in blighted areas also addressed by state and
federal economic development programs.
At any rate, participation is more likely among sites that are slated for industrial
use, and grows with distance from residential areas and—but only weakly—with the
percentage of the surrounding land designated as industrial. 15 The number of nearby
properties previously enrolled in the VCP is positively associated with the probability of
participation. It is possible that successful participation encourages enrollment of other

15

The probit regressions reported in table 3 all use the 1500-meter buffer when computing the percentage
of surrounding land dedicated to industrial uses, but we obtain the same result when we use smaller buffer
sizes (e.g. 500 meters) to capture closer neighbors of each property in the sample.
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nearby sites. Alternatively, this may also be due to the spatial clustering of brownfields,
or to other unobserved amenities.
Specification (B) confirms the results of specification (A), and also suggests that
the prevalence of industrial properties among those enlisted in the VCP has strengthened
in recent years, as shown by the positive and significant coefficient of MINDUSTRIAL3.
Specification (C) adds median housing values and education level of the residents in the
census tract around each property, but neither variable has an independent effect on the
likelihood of participation. We had intended these variables to proxy for up-and-coming
neighborhoods, but their effect (if any) is probably already captured in other site and
neighborhood characteristics.

Specification (D) includes other characteristics of the

residents, namely the percentages of persons who live in poverty, own their homes, and
are African American. In both (C) and (D), likelihood ratio tests indicate that the newly
added census-tract variables are jointly insignificant.
To get a sense of the magnitude of the probit coefficients, using specification (B),
we compute the annual probability of participation for a hypothetical industrial-use parcel
of average size, distance to the CBD and capital intensity, and in an Enterprise Zone. We
assume that this site has the average prior probability of contamination, that it is
surrounded by the average extent of industrial land and is at the average distance from
residential areas. For a parcel with these characteristics during the first period of the
program (1997-99), the probability of participation in any given year is 6.52%. Increasing
the size of this average parcel by a standard deviation (i.e., by 12.02 acres above the
original 5.43 acres) slightly decreases the probability of enrollment from 6.52% to
4.69%.
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The story changes in more recent years: A parcel that is average in all respects
and is zoned for industrial use would now have a much greater annual probability of
participation (25.33%), which increases to 28.27% if the parcel’s size is increased by a
standard deviation above the average. If this parcel during the most recent years of the
program was located an additional quarter mile away from the nearest residential zone (a
two standard-deviation increase), then the probability of participation would increase
from 25.33% to 34.91%.

7. Discussion
Now that we have established what characteristics influence whether a site is
enrolled in the VCP and the magnitude of such influences, it is important to discuss what
happens after enrollment. Specifically, are parcels participating in the Maryland VCP
likely to be redeveloped soon? Possibly, but we believe that redevelopment is unlikely to
bring significant land use changes. Of the 58 properties that had received a NFRD letter
or a CoC within our study period, residential use was explicitly prohibited at 44 of them
(75.80%). At 12 of them (20.69%), only limited residential development was allowed.
We obtained the specific land use before and after VCP completion for 40 of the
properties that completed the program. Only 8 changed uses after completion: Most of
them were converted from parking lots, warehouses, and manufacturing facilities to
offices (3, 2 and 1 properties, respectively). Only two properties were converted to
residential use (one was initially a warehouse and the other a manufacturing facility).
Taken together with the fact that the likelihood of participation is greater at
industrial properties in industrial areas and increases with distance from residential
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neighborhoods, the above evidence is suggestive that the vast majority of redevelopment
would either keep the existing land use or convert the parcel to non-residential uses.
Infill redevelopment is touted as helping meet Smart Growth goals and avoiding
conversion of open space, so it is natural to ask how well the VCP is doing in this respect.
As of December 2006, there were a total of 1,175 acres enrolled in the VCP in Baltimore
City alone.
Deason et al. (2001) consider 8 brownfield properties in Baltimore City and
assume redevelopment as office buildings, commercial facilities, or homes (see table C.1
in Appendix C). They calculate the land area that would be necessary if such
redevelopment projects took place in surrounding suburban areas (Baltimore County,
Kent County, and Frederick County). They consistently find that, based on local zoning,
such redevelopment projects would require larger land areas in these latter three counties
than in Baltimore City.
Assuming that all of the participating 1,175 acres are redeveloped and remain in
their use at the time of enrollment, we use the land area “ratios” derived by Deason et al.
to estimate the amount of open space that the VCP may have deterred from being
developed (see table B.2 in Appendix B). We consider greenfields in Baltimore County
as likely substitutes for infill development because this rural/suburban area surrounds
Baltimore City and is part of the overall Metropolitan area. If the urban redevelopment
projects on VCP properties were instead built on greenfields, they would require as many
as 6,444 acres in suburban Baltimore County under generous assumptions about the
conversion “ratio” between city and suburban projects, and 1,238 under more
conservative assumptions.
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This suggests that if greenfields and brownfields are truly substitutable then the VCP is
potentially an effective tool to deter open space conversion.

8. Conclusions
To understand the promise and potential of voluntary cleanup programs in
promoting remediation and reuse of brownfields, we have focused on participation in the
Maryland VCP, which began in 1997. To ensure a homogeneous legal and tax
environment, we have restricted attention to the 116 Baltimore City sites that have
participated as of the end of 2006.
The vast majority of the applications (66%) request a “No Further Requirements
Determination” on the part of the agency, suggesting that much participation in the
program is simply motivated by developers or business owners’ desire to protect
themselves from future environmental liability. A clean bill of health may, of course, also
increase the value of property (and of any redevelopment project on site). In that sense,
the evidence from Baltimore confirms the findings for the Colorado VCP reported in
Alberini (2007).
We compare the VCP properties with a sample of similar size selected at random
from the universe of industrial and commercial properties in Baltimore. Probit
regressions confirm that participation is more likely among industrial sites located in
industrial areas, and less likely in the presence of improvements and heavy building
capitalization. They also show that the distances to the city center and major roads,
respectively, are not very important. Even more important, the probit regressions point to
the changing nature of the program—or of the sites that tend to be attracted to the
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program. In the first few years of the program, smaller properties tended to be attracted
into the VCP. Most recently, however, participation has been more likely among larger
properties, and the prevalence of industrial sites among the participants has become even
stronger.
Given the surrounding land use and the restrictions imposed on the use of the
property by the VCP approval, it is likely that such industrial properties will be kept in
industrial or perhaps commercial use, but will not be turned into residential projects.
This conclusion is in sharp contrast with the findings in Alberini (2007), who concludes
that properties who signed up with the Colorado VCP were most likely under residential
development pressure. Given the limited body of research about VCPs and their contextspecific findings, it will be necessary to conduct more research at a variety of locations
before one can attempt to extrapolate from one locale to another.
Assuming that all of the participating 1,175 acres are redeveloped and remain in
their use at the time of enrollment, and using the land area “ratios” derived by Deason et
al. (2001), we estimate that if the urban redevelopment projects on VCP properties were
instead built on greenfields, they would require between 1,238 and 6,444 acres in
suburban Baltimore County. Since the majority of participating sites tend to remain in
non-residential uses it appears that VCP programs, at least in the case of Baltimore,
encourage potentially contaminating activities to take place on already contaminated
brownfields, thus leaving pristine land available as open space or for less
environmentally damaging uses.
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Appendix A. Maps of sample sites in Baltimore City.
Map A.1.
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Map A.2.

Map A.3.
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Appendix B. Calculation of land area conversion ratios.
Table B.1. Property specific conversion ratios.

property
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Deason et al. calculations for Baltimore City Brownfield Properties
required area if in
Baltimore County
size
(acres)
ratio
(acres)
assumed reuse
15 office buildings
18.37 1 : 1.22
4.5 redeveloped comm. facility
9.18 1 : 2.04
0.7 office buildings
4.59 1 : 6.12
2.75 two office buildings
5.42 1 : 1.97
residential multi-family
6 complex
6.00 1 : 1
1.3 residential, 26 townhomes
2.25 1 : 1.73
2.8 residential
2.23 1 : 0.80
0.17 two-story office building
0.67 1 : 3.94

Source: Deason et al. (2001).
Table B.2. Development conversion rates assumed in this paper (see Section 7).

land use

total
acres

N

"ratio"

total required for
equivalent projects
in suburban areas

A. Generous assumptions*

industrial
commercial
residential
other

industrial
commercial
residential
other

83
14
6
13

975.02
62.86
32.79
104.86

6.24
3.0875
1.86
1.00
Total
B. More conservative assumptions**
83
975.02
1.00
14
62.86
2.00
6
32.79
1.00
13
104.86
1.00
total

6084.12
194.08
60.99
104.86
6444.05
975.02
125.72
32.79
104.86
1238.39

Note:
* Means of the conversion ratios for the Baltimore projects reported in Deason et al.
(2001), except for industrial use projects, where the figure in this table (.6.24) is the
nationwide average for industrial projects nationwide. (Deason et al. do not do examine
industrial projects for Baltimore.)
** Median conversion ratios. The same exceptions as in * apply.
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